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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a new privacy-enhancing, context-aware user
authentication system, ConSec, which uses a transformation of
general location-sensitive data, such as GPS location, barometric
altitude and noise levels, collected from the user’s device, into a rep-
resentation based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH). The resulting
hashes provide a dimensionality reduction of the underlying data,
which we leverage to model users’ behaviour for authentication
using machine learning. We present how ConSec supports learning
from categorical and numerical data, while addressing a number
of on-device and network-based threats. ConSec is implemented
subsequently for the Android platform and evaluated using data
collected from 35 users, which is followed by a security and privacy
analysis. We demonstrate that LSH presents a useful approach for
context authentication from location-sensitive data without directly
utilising plain measurements.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Authentication; Privacy-preserving
protocols; Mobile and wireless security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Secure and usable mobile authentication mechanisms are critical
to numerous applications, including internet banking, email, and
social media. Traditional knowledge-based authentication mechan-
isms, such as PINs, patterns and passwords, remain fraught with
concerns surrounding memorability, credential reuse, sufficient
entropy, and shoulder-surfing attacks [20, 27]. Meanwhile, token-
based methods, e.g. one-time password (OTP) generators and key
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fobs, can be lost or stolen and are generally costly to produce,
maintain and replace [18]. Biometrics, such as fingerprint and
facial authentication, have become widely-deployed on modern
mobile handsets; however, environmental factors, like moisture,
injury, skin complexion, and lighting can significantly increase er-
ror rates [6]. Traditional approaches also feature an overarching
drawback: the user is authenticated only once, after which all access
to assets and services and granted thereafter. Such all-or-nothing
authentication has prompted both security and usability concerns
in related literature [11, 13, 14, 22].
Context authentication systems have arisen from these concerns,
which transparently compute an authentication score from device
data, such as GPS location, nearby Wi-Fi access points (APs), and
cellular network information, with respect to previously observed
behaviour [11, 14, 17, 25]. Such systems may infer the user’s authen-
tication status directly, i.e. accept/reject [25], or determine access
control policies and explicit authentication strength [14, 17]. Unfor-
tunately, many context authentication systems necessitate collect-
ing swathes of privacy-sensitive data. This is especially problematic
if the scheme is deployed by a remote authentication service and the
data is later disclosed in a security breach or misused without con-
sent. Several surveys have already demonstrated users’ reticence in
disclosing location data used by many context authentication pro-
posals [3, 5, 9]. Fisher-Short et al. [9] show, for instance, that users
tend to deny mobile applications the permission to access location
data because of concerns about it being transmitted remotely and
shared surreptitiously with third-parties.
In light of this discussion, we present a novel context authen-
tication system, ConSec, which enhances the confidentiality of
device data using the Super-Bit Locality-Sensitive Hashing (SB-
LSH) proposal by Ji et al. [15]. SB-LSH is a dimensionality reduc-
tion algorithm wherein the locality-sensitive hashes reveal only
the relative distance between user location measurements without
disclosing their precise location on Earth; from this, machine learn-
ing can be applied to model the user’s behaviour. In this work,
we demonstrate how ConSec enables computation over numerical
and categorical data, e.g. Wi-Fi ESSIDs, to flexibly support various
modalities for privacy-enhancing contextual authentication. We
evaluate ConSec using data collected from 35 participants, after
which we analyse its effectiveness against certain attacks, such as
triangulation, and their effect on error rates.
The main contributions of this paper is a new approach to contex-
tual authentication by protecting the confidentiality of numerical
location-sensitive data, such as GPS coordinates, using SB-LSH [15].
ConSec can learn user authentication models from protected nu-
merical and categorical data using standard machine learning al-
gorithms with low error rates. This paper begins with a review of
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
08
80
0v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 J
ul 
20
19
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom P. Mainali, C. Shepherd, and F. A. P. Petitcolas
existing contextual and privacy-enhancing continuous authentica-
tion schemes in Section 2. Section 3 then describes the architecture
of the ConSec, including the threat model and the modalities used.
Sections 4 and 5 describe the use of LSH and keyed HMACs for
privacy-preserving behavioural modelling from numerical and cat-
egorical data respectively for contextual authentication. Next, an
evaluation of the proposed scheme is presented from a user base
of 35 users in Section 6, which is followed by a security and pri-
vacy analysis in Section 7. Lastly, Section 8 concludes this paper,
including a discussion of future research directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
This section explores the state-of-the-art of contextual authentic-
ation, focused on in this work, and privacy-enhancing continuous
authentication generally. We summarise notable proposals and their
contributions.
2.1 Contextual Authentication
The CASA system by Hayashi et al. [14] focuses on reducing the
strength of user-authentication challenges based on the current
location of the user and previously observed behaviour. The au-
thentication strength is determined by the presence of the user
in location of varying perceived risk, such as at home or at work.
CASA applies a Naïve Bayes classifier to model user behaviour from
GPS location, which produces a probability value based on their
past behaviour to determine the device’s explicit authentication
strength, e.g. password, PIN or even no challenge. The system is
trialled using 32 users, with a location classification accuracy of
92%, and 68% of explicit authentication attempts being reduced.
SenGuard by Shi et al. [25] uses five modalities—location, cell
tower ID, voice, touch, and motion-based activity recognition (cyc-
ling, walking, stationary, etc.)—from which a multitude of features
are extracted, including touch gestures, GPS correlation, and Leven-
shtein distance of cell IDs in a sliding window. From this, the system
computes an aggregated authentication decision from individual,
modality-specific classifiers, which is used to authenticate the user
in a binary fashion, i.e. accept or reject. SenGuard is evaluated with
a user base of four participants, yielding a classification accuracy
of 95.8–97.1% depending on the user.
Gupta et al. [11] present the first proposal for setting mobile
device access control policies based on users’ contexts. The authors
use features based on Context of Interest (CoI), corresponding to
locations a user visits frequently or spends significant amounts
of time in. CoIs are generated from clusters of GPS coordinates,
Wi-Fi access points (APs) and nearby Bluetooth devices, which are
compared with past data using similarity metrics, such as the set
intersection, using manually set threshold values. The CoIs are
then divided into ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ locations, such as ‘at home’
and ‘out shopping’ respectively, which are used for dynamically
setting access control policy profiles. An evaluation with 37 users
resulted in average precisions of 0.854 (safe locations) and 0.311
(unsafe), and recalls of 0.917 (safe) and 0.341 (unsafe).
Miettenen et al. [17] present ConXsense, which uses contextual
data for setting risk-based device locks, akin to [14], as well as access
control policy profiles. The authors also generate CoI features, but,
unlike [11], these are inputted to a classifier with ground truth
labels drawn from user input. The authors evaluate the system
using data from 15 users and Random Forest, k-Nearest Neighbour
(kNN), and Naïve Bayes classifiers, with an approximate 0.70 true
positive rate (TPR) and 0.10 false positive rate (FPR).
Witte et al. [30] propose a system for scoring authentication be-
haviour based on the device’s GPS location, accelerometer, magnetic
field, light, battery and sound measurements. Statistical features
are extracted from the raw measurements, such as the arithmetic
mean, median, maximum and minimum values, which are aggreg-
ated with system-level features, such as screen status and boot and
shutdown times. Feature vectors are inputted to an SVM classifier
trained on user data collected over a three-day period; an evalu-
ation is performed using data from 15 participants, with an average
F1-score of 0.85.
2.2 Privacy-Enhancing Continuous
Authentication
Shahandashti et al. [23] propose a scheme for computing authentic-
ation decisions remotely on an honest-but-curious server from en-
crypted feature vectors using Paillier homomorphic encryption [19].
Encrypted behavioural models are stored on a remote server and
a decision is computed homomorphically from encrypted feature
vectors transmitted from the user’s device without exposing the
plaintext measurements. The decision is computed from the dissim-
ilarity between incoming features and the stored user profile using
the average absolute distance (AAD); the user is authenticated if the
AAD similarity falls within a threshold determined by the service
provider. However, while a security proof is provided, the scheme
is neither implemented nor evaluated in practice.
Domingo-Ferrer et al. [8] develop the work from [23] by present-
ing an additional approach based on the set intersection of homo-
morphically encrypted feature vectors to authenticate users. The set
intersection is used to compute the dissimilarity function between
the encrypted user profile and incoming feature vectors to support
categorical features, beyond only numerical features supported in
[23]. The authors provide a performance evaluation in which au-
thentication takes 0.08–31.2 seconds depending on the number of
input features (1–50 features respectively).
Sedenka et al. [28] construct protocols for the outsourcing of the
scaled Manhattan (L1) and Euclidean (L2) distances and principal
component analysis (PCA) using garbled circuits and homomorphic
encryption for use in continuous authentication. The work tackles
the case of computing the similarity of incoming feature vectors
with stored user models in the presence of an honest-but-curious
server. The authors provide a security analysis and performance
evaluation using a consumer laptop and smartphone, the results
of which yield a communication and time penalty of 4–174MB and
0.85s–45.9s respectively based on the submitted feature vector size.
Halunen and Vallivaara [12] present a privacy-enhancing con-
tinuous authentication system based on keystroke dynamics with
order-preserving symmetric encryption (OPSE) and, like [23], Pail-
lier homomorphic encryption. The proposal extracts four features
regarding the down-down, up-down and down-up times of each key-
stroke, along with the entered string. Next, the AAD is computed
homomorphically between the sample and the stored template
values, while OPSE is used for comparing samples with various
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Table 1: Related contextual authentication schemes.
Proposals Data Modalities Error Rates
CASA [14] GPS Location 92% Acc.
SenGuard [25] GPS Location, Voice,Touch, AR 95.8–97.1% Acc.
Gupta et al. [11] GPS Location, Wi-Fi APs,Bluetooth Devices
0.311–0.854 Pr.,
0.341–0.917 Re.
ConXsense [17] GPS Location, Wi-Fi APs,Bluetooth Devices ∼70% TPR, 10% FPR
Witte et al. [30] GPS Location, Sys., AC,MF, Sound, Light ∼0.85 F1-score
AC: Accelerometer, MF: Magnetic Field, Sys.: System Data, Acc.:
Classification Accuracy, FPR: False Positive Rate, TPR: True Positive
Rate, AR: Activity Recognition, Pr.: Precision, Re.: Recall.
thresholds to fine-tune security and usability. An evaluation is
conducted with 20 users yielding a best-case accuracy of 91.5%.
2.3 Discussion
Many existing contextual authentication proposals, summarised in
Table 1, use device measurements in unprotected form—giving rise
to privacy concerns especially when authentication decisions are
outsourced to a remote server [8, 23, 28]. As noted previously, stud-
ies have already shown that users are generally reluctant towards
disclosing, in particular, their GPS location to device applications [3–
5, 9]. Some users also disable GPS depending on the sensitivity of
the location they visit, irrespective of the application [3]. Work in
[9] also shows that, when permission is denied to an application
that accesses GPS location, it is principally from concerns relating
to whether location data is stored securely (on-device and remotely)
and whether it is shared with other parties without consent.
Current approaches to privacy-enhancing continuous authentic-
ation have employed homomorphic encryption, e.g. Paillier [19],
and garbled circuits for two-party computation (2PC) [8, 12, 23, 28].
However, challenges still remain with respect computational com-
plexity and storage overhead, which is exemplified by worst cases of
31.2s and 45.9s to compute authentication decisions in [8] and [28]
respectively. Storage complexity is also an issue, with 4–175MB
required for computing a single authentication decision in [28]. Ho-
momorphic encryption-based schemes also face inherent challenges
regarding the supported arithmetic operations for learning from
data, i.e. only additions for Paillier-based proposals. Fully homo-
morphic encryption (FHE) [10], meanwhile, has been deemed too
cumbersome in the literature for high-frequency, high-dimensional
classification tasks like continuous authentication [23, 28].
Lastly, we note that the work in [12] focuses on keystroke-based
authentication, which necessitates user interaction. Rather, the
focus of this work is context authentication from device sensors
without interaction from the user. Ultimately, we aim to demon-
strate a simpler approach to privacy-enhancing, zero-interaction
context authentication based on keyed HMACs and the Super-Bit
Locality-Sensitive Hashing (SB-LASH) algorithm by Ji et al. [15],
without resorting to the complexities of homomorphic encryption
and multi-party computation used in existing solutions.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the system architecture of ConSec for
performing context authentication, beginning with a high-level
overview before describing the threat model and data modalities
considered in this work.
3.1 System Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the block diagram of ConSec, comprising the
ConSec-App on the smartphone for data collection and transmis-
sion, and the authentication algorithm (ConSec-Auth) that executes
remotely on the authentication server. ConSec-App transforms
categorical contextual data, such as nearby Wi-Fi ESSIDs and MAC
addresses, using HMAC-SHA256 under a randomly generated, per-
user key within the application, which we denote HK . Numerical
location-sensitive data, such as the device’s GPS location and baro-
metric altitude, is transformed using the Super-Bit LSH (SB-LSH)
algorithm proposed in [15]. The transformed HMAC and SB-LSH
values are transmitted to ConSec-Auth, which computes the au-
thentication score based on the user’s previously observed beha-
viour. We return to the complete set of contextual data collected by
ConSec-App in Section 3.3.
Figure 1(b) shows the block diagram of the ConSec-Auth al-
gorithm, comprising enrollment and authentication phases. We
build on the assumption that contextual data generally form clusters
around locations frequently visited by the user, such as home, work,
and so on, according to their day-to-day mobility patterns. The
enrollment phase constructs the initial model that represents these
mobility patterns, which is employed in the authentication phase
to compute a real-valued authentication score of the user’s newly
observed behaviour, S ∈ [0, 1], to be used by the service provider.
3.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
ConSec aims to provide lightweight, server-side context authen-
tication for informing secure access to remote assets from mobile
sensor data. The scheme is intended to allow a service provider
to tailor access to sensitive assets based on the output probability
without incurring the complexities of existing techniques, such as
homomorphic encryption [8, 12, 23, 28].
Server-side, we assume a remote service operating under the
honest-but-curious model, which executes the scheme as intended
but attempts to infer users’ behaviour based on the device data
samples that it observes. The service may use any insights for
unintended purposes, such as profiled advertising or selling the
information to unauthorised third-parties without consent. That is,
the goal is to provide context authentication for informing server-
side access control while precluding the service’s ability to easily
recover the actual measurements it receives. However, we note that,
even under model whereby the server is wholly honest, the use of
privacy-preserving context authentication also limits the impact of
security breaches that lead to the unauthorised disclosure of plain-
text measurements, and the publicity or legal repercussions that
may follow. We also assume that the ConSec mobile application is
available in a trusted application store.
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Figure 1: High-level architecture: (a) ConSec context-aware authentication flow; (b) ConSec authentication algorithm.
On the device, we assume a trusted keystore and the ability to
collect, transform and transmit sensor values securely. The key-
store is used to hold certificates used to mutually authenticate the
end-points for transmitting feature data across a standard network
channel, e.g. Wi-Fi, securely using TLS. Both components may
be instantiated using conventional security controls provided by
modern mobile operating systems, such as application sandboxing,
which we concentrate on this work. However, for further secur-
ity assurances against kernel-mode (ring 0) adversaries, this may
be realised using a trusted execution environment (TEE), as sug-
gested in [16] and [24]. We also consider a context-manipulating
adversary, e.g. [26], with the ability to influence the measurements
collected by the device; for example, by instantiating rogue Wi-Fi
APs with spoofed ESSIDs and MAC addresses to maliciously influ-
ence the authentication scoring algorithm. This forms the basis of
the evaluation described later in Section 6.
3.3 Contextual Data
Modern mobile devices contain a varieties of sensors, such as GPS
chips, magnetometers, accelerometers and pressure sensors, and
related modules, e.g. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, that can be used for
collecting contextual data. The data types used by ConSec are de-
scribed in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Geographic Location. The geographic location of the user is
collected from the device’s GPS module or, if it is unavailable, using
Android’s network location, which returns recently observed GPS
coordinates, or coordinates based on the Cell ID or Wi-Fi network
location in that order [1]. The geodetic latitude (ϕ) and longitude (λ)
values are first transformed to the Earth-Centre-Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
Cartesian coordinate system accounting for the Earth’s ellipsoidal
shape using the WGS84 model [7]. Equation 1 is used to transform
the geodetic latitude ϕ, longitude λ and altitude h cordinates to the
ECEF coordinate system. The coordinates of a point p in Cartesian
coordinates on Earth’s surface are given by:
©­«
px
py
pz
ª®¬ = ©­«
(N (ϕ) + h) cos(ϕ) cos(λ)
(N (ϕ) + h) cos(ϕ) sin(λ)((b2/a2)N (ϕ) + h) sin(ϕ) ª®¬ (1)
where
N (ϕ) = a√
(1 − e2 sin2(ϕ))
(2)
and the squared first-eccentricity (e2), the semi-major axis (a) and
the semi-minor axis (b) are taken fromWGS84: e2 = 6.69437999014×
10−3, a = 6378137m and b = 6356752.3142m.
3.3.2 Barometric Altitude. Barometric pressure provides informa-
tion regarding the height of the device from the sea level as atmo-
spheric pressure is proportional to altitude; it is also measurable
within enclosed spaces, e.g. buildings, where GPS coordinates may
not be ascertained. The barometric altitude is calculated from the
measured pressure, p, reference pressure, p0, and temperature, T0,
using the following formula from [29]:
H =
273.15 +T0
0.0065
(
1 −
(
p
p0
) 1
5.255
)
(3)
ConSec-App uses METAR1 (Meteorological Aerodrome Report) for
acquiring p0 and T0.
3.3.3 Noise Level. The average amplitude of the background noise
is estimated using a three-second recording from the device’s micro-
phone. This provides additional contextual information regarding
the user’s location, which is also used in [30] as an authentica-
tion feature; for intuition, the device will likely measure a lower
amplitude in a quiet office versus a loud city-centre environment.
3.3.4 Magnetic Fingerprint. This comprises the geomagnetic field
strength and the geomagnetic inclination angle computed from the
device’s magnetometer and accelerometer sensors. Magnetic field
data varies on the Earth’s surface—it is strongest at the poles and
weakest at the equator—and thus provides some information about
the user’s location. The magnetic inclination angle is the angle at
which the magnetic field lines intersects with the surface of the
Earth; it ranges from zero degrees at the equator to 90 degrees at
the poles. The accelerometer data is used to find the orientation
of the device with respect to the world coordinate system, and
the field data read by the device’s magnetometer is transformed to
1METAR: https://www.aviationweather.gov/dataserver
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align with respect to the world coordinate system from which the
magnetic inclination angle is computed.
3.3.5 Wi-Fi. The data collected from Wi-Fi networks includes the
name and the MAC address of the router to which the phone is
connected, the primary and secondary DNS settings of the router,
the received signal strength indication (RSSI), and the list of Wi-Fi
names and MAC addresses of nearby access points (APs).
3.3.6 Mobile Network. The data collected from a mobile network
comprises the mobile network type—2G, 3G, and so on—RSSI, oper-
ator name, mobile network code (MNC), mobile network country
code (MCC), location area code (LAC), and mobile network cell ID.
3.3.7 Bluetooth. The Bluetooth module of ConSec acquires a list of
the (visible) Bluetooth device names and MAC addresses detected
within the device’s vicinity.
4 ENHANCING THE PRIVACY OF
CONTEXTUAL DATA
Evidently, location-sensitive data carries private information re-
garding the user’s whereabouts that could be exploited, particularly
when authentication decisions are computed remotely. This is a
major shortcoming of many existing contextual authentication
schemes identified in Section 2. As such, to enhance the privacy
of the location-sensitive information listed previously, numerical
contextual data is subject to the SB-LSH algorithm by Ji et al. [15],
while keyed HMACs are used for categorical data. The following
sections describe these procedures in further detail.
4.1 Numerical Data
The SB-LSH algorithm [15] is computed from seven features: the
geographic location p = (px ,py ,pz ) from Section 3.3.1; the baro-
metric altitude; the noise level; the magnetic field strength; and
the magnetic inclination angle. This information is salted with a
long-lived, randomly generated, per-user value, s , which is used to
create an eight-dimensional vector, x.
SB-LSH is initialised by generating K eight-dimensional vec-
tors [v1, v2, . . . , vK] sampled from the normal distribution N(0, 1)
and orthogonalised in blocks of eight vectors using the Gram-
Schmidt process. The vector, x, is then projected to producehvi (x) =
sign(viT x), where sign(.) is defined as:
sign(z) =1, z ≥ 0
0, z < 0 (4)
This results in aK-bit hash codeH (x) = {hv1 (x),hv2 (x), . . . ,hvK (x)}.
It is also shown in [15] that the Hamming distance between two
hash codes, a and b, is related to the angular distance, θa,b :
E
[
dHamming (h(a),h(b))
]
=
Kθa,b
π
= Cθa,b (5)
WhereC = K/π is constant. As such, the similarity (cosine distance)
between the hash values can be computed. The K randomly initial-
ized LSH vectors are used to compute the location-hash. An issue
then arises pertaining to setting the value of K , which depends on
the security strength and the accuracy that is needed in computing
the distance from the location-hash. In both cases, a large value of
K is desired; however, on the other hand, a large K increases the
Table 2: Error variation for K bits in LSH.
K bits MAE RMSE
128 41.908 65.709
256 35.132 44.051
512 26.654 32.236
1024 17.655 23.181
2048 13.355 17.049
4096 9.785 12.648
8192 7.568 9.722
16384 6.160 7.874
amount of data needed to be transmitted and stored on the server. A
value of K that gives a reasonable error in computing the distance
without compromising security is hence needed.
We evaluated this for different values of K as follows. One thou-
sand different location pairs were generated randomly, where the
first location value in the pair was generated randomly and the
second was generated to be 25km away from the first. 25km was
chosen as a preliminary value as we assume that general user mo-
bility patterns are limited geographically to small regions, say, for
work and home. The true and approximate central angles between
the locations in the pair were computed from the actual location
values and the location hash codes respectively. The experiment
was repeated for ten thousand different SB-LSH hash codes. Table 2
shows the mean absolute error (MAE) and root-mean-square er-
ror (RMSE) for different K values, averaged over all hash code
instances. The error in computing the distance between the loca-
tions can be computed as the central angle between the locations is
known, which is computed using the great circle distance formula
as follows:
d = 2 × R × sin
(
θ
2
)
(6)
Where θ is the central angle between the actual locations in ra-
dians and R = 6371 km is the mean radius of Earth. The error in
computing the distance from location-hashes is given by:
de = 2 × R ×
(
sin
(
θt
2
)
− sin
(
θa
2
))
(7)
Where θa is approximate central angle between the locations in
radians computed from the location-hashes and θt is true central
angle computed from actual location values. Table 2 shows that
both the MAE and RMSE reduces with larger K values. The error
is larger than the actual distance of 25km for K smaller than 2048.
In this paper, we fix K = 4096 for our experiments in Section 6.
4.2 Categorical Data
For categorical data types, HMAC-SHA256 is computed upon each
data sample, which is keyed under a 128-bit long-lived key,HK , that
is generated randomly upon initialisation by the ConSec mobile
application. HK is unique to each application and should, ideally,
be generated and stored securely in the device’s keystore. The
following section describes how HMAC and SB-LSH protected data
is used by the ConSec authentication algorithm.
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Table 3: ConSec contextual data modalities.
Contextual Modality Feature Type Data Type
Location-hash † N
Wi-Fi state OHE C
Wi-Fi router MAC OHE C
Wi-Fi SSID OHE C
Wi-Fi IP OHE C
Wi-Fi network ID OHE C
Wi-Fi RSSI V N
Wi-Fi frequency OHE C
Wi-Fi router IP OHE C
Wi-Fi router DNS-1 OHE C
Wi-Fi router DNS-2 OHE C
List of Wi-Fi names OHE C
List of Wi-Fi MACs OHE C
List of Wi-Fi frequencies OHE C
SIM state OHE C
Network data state OHE C
Network data type OHE C
Network RSSI V N
Network operator name OHE C
Network MCC MNC OHE C
Network LAC OHE C
Network Cell ID OHE C
Bluetooth device names OHE C
Bluetooth device MACs OHE C
Day index OHE C
Time V N
†: Cosine similarity with six references, V: real value, OHE:
one-hot encoded, N: numerical, C: categorical.
5 AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
This section details how users’ authentication models are learned
from SB-LSH and HMAC-applied contextual data.
5.1 Feature Extraction
Table 3 lists the 32 contextual data types employed by ConSec. The
LSH data is pre-processed to compute the featurewherein the cosine
similarity values are computed with respect to a reference value
collected during the enrollment phase. The modal (most frequent)
LSH value from the enrollment samples is used as this reference.
For categorical data, one-hot encoded (OHE) features are created to
map categorical values to numerical representations; OHE results
in a sparse matrix as an output, where each column corresponds
to one possible value of the data. Real-valued data types, indic-
ated in Table 3, are used directly. We note that feature vectors are
standardised to zero mean and unit variance once computed.
5.2 Learning User Authentication Models
Computed features are subsequently inputted to a k-means clus-
tering algorithm, which is initialised using the k-means++ method
by Arthur and Vassilvitskii [2]. Clustering was chosen from the
ConSec	Mobile
Application
Authentication
Server
4. Verify and
decrypt data
5. Feature Extraction
6. Feature Matching
7. Normalisation
8. Auth. Score
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1. Collect
sensor data
2. Apply
SB-LSHs 
and HMACs
Figure 2: Information flow for user authentication.
assumption, based from related work [11, 14, 17], that users’ contex-
tual data has a tendency to form clusters according to their mobility
patterns, such as regularly frequenting places of work and home.
We are interested in detecting the centroid of these clusters, thus
k-means was used, but this necessitates some number of clusters,
k , to be specified in advance. As such, the algorithm is executed
for different values of k = [5, 10, 15, 20, 25], stopping for a value
of k if the rate of the clustering error falls below a convergence
threshold, ϵ1. In the experiments, a threshold of ϵ1 = 0.05 (5%)
was used. Additionally, we prune clusters with population density
lower than a separate threshold, ϵ2. We fix ϵ2 = 0.025 (2.5%) in
our experiments so that clusters with densities below this, i.e. very
rarely or transiently frequented, are removed from the user model.
5.3 Authentication Procedure
As shown in Figure 1b, ConSec-Auth is ready to enter the authen-
tication phase once the user models are created. This comprises an
eight step process illustrated in Figure 2 and described as follows:
(1) Data Collection. Data is sampled by ConSec-App at 10
minute intervals using the modalities listed in Table 3.
(2) Device Pre-Processing. Next, ConSec-App applies SB-LSHs
and HMACs to numerical and contextual modalities respect-
ively, as described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
(3) Data Transmission. The SB-LSH and HMAC values are
transmitted over a secure channel between ConSec-App and
ConSec-Auth using TLS.
(4) Verification and Decryption. The server verifies and re-
covers the device feature vectors from the secure channel.
(5) Feature Extraction. This follows the procedure described
in Section 5.1 to produce a feature vector, f .
(6) Feature Matching. ConSec-Auth computes the Euclidean
(L2) distance between f and the cluster centroids of the user’s
model. The smallest distance (d) is selected.
(7) Normalisation. The smallest distance d is normalized as dq ,
where q is a normalizing constant. The score is computed as
S = 1 − dq .
(8) Score Output. The authentication score, S ∈ [0, 1], is re-
turned as output.
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5.4 Model Refreshing
Some contextual data may change over time due to behavioural
shifts in the users’ mobility patterns; for example, after joining a
new workplace or moving house in a new town/city where the old
locations have little relevance. This applies not only to changes in
the users’ GPS locations, but also the lists of detected Wi-Fi APs,
nearby Bluetooth devices, background noise, and other modalities;
users’ authentication data models should be updated regularly to
reflect these changes. In this work, a weekly interval was chosen
as a default to re-evaluate behavioural shifts; however, the model
of the previous week is retained if 33.3% of the contextual data is
predicted with higher accuracy (assuming the user spends at least
8 out of 24 hours at a regular location, e.g. home or office).
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, experiments are presented for evaluating the robust-
ness of ConSec, which were conducted using data collected from
35 participants.
6.1 Data Collection
Participation emails were sent to 250 employees within a European-
based US technology company, resulting in 35 users who enrolled in
the trial; no incentives were offered for participation. Participants
were requested to install and launch the ConSec application on
their primary smartphone, after which no further interaction was
required; users were able to start/stop data collection at will and
withdraw at any time by uninstalling the application. Prior to this,
participants were informed about types of data collected; that it
would be stored alongside an anonymous, randomly-generated user
ID; and an explanation of how the collected data itself was protected
on the server. Supplementarymaterial was also distributed via email.
The data collection period lasted five weeks.
Upon installation, the application randomly generated unique
SB-LSH parameters and HK for the keying HMACs, which were
held only on the device. The application collected contextual data
at 10 minute intervals, which is encrypted under AES in GCMmode
using a key, AK , generated randomly for each message. AK is then
encrypted using asymmetric encryption (RSA-2048) using the Con-
Sec certified public-key, PK , contained within the application, and
transmitted to the server which possesses the private portion. Both
the data and the encrypted AK are transmitted as a single message,
m, over TLS to the authentication server. This is listed in Equa-
tions 8 and 9. This process was conducted to protect participants’
data at rest on our authentication server.
Data = AES-GCMAK
{
LSH(px ,py ,pz ,Alt.,Noise, . . . ),
HMACHK (Wi-FiMAC),
HMACHK (Wi-FiESSID), . . .
} (8)
m =
{
Data, RSA-EncPK (AK)
}
(9)
Tominimise battery consumption, the ConSec-App placed sensors
into low-power mode due to the relatively low sampling frequency
(once every 10 minutes). Preliminary experiments on a single device
showed that ConSec-App consumes a negligible (∼1%) amount of
power, indicated by the power management metrics provided by
Android OS on our test device (Samsung Galaxy S8). The encrypted
contextual data was uploaded to a server on a weekly basis over
Figure 3: ROC curves for (a) 3, (b) 5, (c) 7 and (d) 9 numbers
of the modified contextual data modalities (averaged across
all participants).
TLS with an anonymous user ID generated by ConSec-App. The
encrypted data was stored on a private corporate machine, with
access granted only to the authors of this work.
6.2 Robustness to Inaccurate Inputs
Unlike previous approaches that rely upon supervised learning,
e.g. CASA [14], ConXsense [17] and SenGuard [25], whereby the
algorithm is trained using labels collected from user input, ConSec
is underpinned by clustering, i.e. unlabelled unsupervised learning.
Evaluating the performance of clustering algorithms is non-trivial
compared with computing the precision, recall, or similar metric
drawn from counting the number of true/false positives/negatives
used in previous work [21].
In this paper, we began our evaluation by measuring the robust-
ness of ConSec to inaccurate values sourced from varying numbers
of data modalities. This is to evaluate its robustness to values mod-
ified by a contextual adversary listed in Section 3.2. To this end,
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were plotted for the
True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) to evaluate
the detection of compromised samples versus unmodified ones.
For this, we selected the 100 closest feature vectors to the cluster
centroids using the L2-distance from the training sets of each user.
These samples are labelled as positives that should be accepted by
the system. Next, n feature fields of these samples are modified—
using the procedure described below—and labelled as negatives
that ought to be rejected by the system. This process was repeated
for 1000 distinct trails for various combinations of n = [3, 5, 7, 9]
modalities and across all users.
To modify the categorical data fields, such as Wi-Fi ESSIDs,
the HMAC values (base 64-encoded) were modified to a random
base 64 string of the same length. For numerical data, the SB-LSH
values were modified to a random binary string, also of the same
length. Figure 3 shows the ROC curves using vectors with three,
five, seven and nine contextual modalities. Our results show that
the system approaches an ideal system when seven and nine feature
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Figure 4: Triangulation to derive unknown location,C, from
two known locations, A and B. Only distances from SB-LSH
values d1 and d2 are known for C with respect to A and B.
fields are modified; that is, the experiments show that erroneous
measurements can be detected with TPR=0.975 and FPR=0.025 for
seven affected modalities. This error rates increase significantly as
the number of affected fields decreases; the system is less robust
when n = 3, with approximately TPR=0.8 and FPR=0.2.
7 PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present informal and experimental analyses of
the privacy and security properties offered by ConSec.
7.1 Privacy Analysis
For categorical modalities, ConSec uses HMACs directly to model
user behaviour, which are keyed under a randomly generated,
application-specific key, HK , assumed to be stored securely on the
device. Assuming the use of a secure cryptographic hash function,
this avoids disclosing the actual underlying values to an observant
server. Moreover, the server does not possess HK , thus precluding
the use of dictionary attacks to which non-keyed functions would
be vulnerable.
Regarding SB-LSH for numerical data, we note that some inform-
ation could be leaked based on SB-LSH hashes leaked previously in
conjunction with knowledge of their distances in reality. While the
actual locations on Earth’s surface are masked, SB-LSH reveals the
angular distance between them. This raises the following question:
assuming that some SB-LSH values taken at points during the day
can be mapped to known locations—for example, the user being
at work during the day and at home at midnight—can one deduce
other locations using triangulation?
Suppose locations A and B correspond to the user’s home and
office locations respectively, and the actual GPS coordinates of
these locations are known. The issue pertains to the precision and
accuracy with which the latitude and longitude values of unknown
location C can be triangulated. From the SB-LSH values of A, B
and C , one can compute distances d1 (between C and A) and d2
(between C and B) and solve for the latitude and longitude values
for unknown location C . This can result in locations either C or
C ′. We use the chord distance given in Equation 6 to compute the
distance between the locations, where the approximate angle θa
can be computed from the location-hashes and, R, the mean value
of the radius of Earth. The precision and accuracy to which C can
be localised depends on how accurately and precise d1 and d2 can
Table 4: Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Root-Mean-Square-
Error (RMSE), Mean, and Standard Deviation of distances
errors from SB-LSH values for varying actual distances in
kilometers. (All values given w.r.t. each actual distance).
Actual
distance (km) MAE RMSE Mean Std. Dev.
5 2.826 3.266 -1.109 3.804
10 3.908 4.776 -1.645 4.616
25 9.785 12.648 -2.643 12.344
50 14.779 18.819 -4.683 18.588
100 26.258 33.389 -9.417 29.975
500 100.980 124.377 -51.619 113.846
1000 181.192 230.074 -96.341 212.993
be computed from SB-LSH values. Ultimately, C may be computed
with some precision and accuracy that is determined by a confusion
region with radius dc . The larger error in computing d1 and d2, the
larger dc , thus decreasing the precision to whichC can be localised
and, hence, offering a greater degree of privacy to the user. We
illustrate this in Figure 4 for clarity.
We show that the errors in computing distances, e.g. d1, from
the location-hashes are non-uniform and increase for larger actual
distances. To show this, we perform simulations using randomly
generated pairs of latitude and longitude valueswith a fixed distance
between them. The SB-LSH hashes are computed for the pair values,
and the distance between the locations is computed from SB-LSH
values. The distances are computed using Equation 7. Table 4 shows
the MAE, RMSE, mean, and standard deviation of the errors in
computing distances for differing (actual) distances between the
pairs of d = [5, 10, 25, 100, 500, 1000] kilometers.
Our results show that, as expected, the error is larger when the
location is at a greater actual distance. For example, when C is at
5km from A, the error in computing the distances from the SB-
LSH values has MAE=2.826km; at an actual distance of 25km, this
increases to MAE=9.785km. Thus, C is localised with greater error,
and with poorer accuracy, when it is located further away in reality.
Understanding the actual distribution of the distance errors is
also important; uniformly distributed error is desirable such that
any unknown locations cannot be localised with high probability.
Figures 5 and 6 show the histogram of distance errors for actual
distance of 25 and 50 kilometers respectively using a bin size of
1000 meters. The histogram of the distance error is approximately
Gaussian, with a flat peak and wide variance; the greatest distances
fall at the tails of the distributions. That is, unknown locations that
are far away cannot be localised with low error.
From the above, we can conclude that inferring locations from
SB-LSH values incurs significant error, even if some information is
leaked about the user with the assistance of supplementary know-
ledge about the users’ actual locations in reality. This uncertainty
is determined primarily by the largest distance of the two closest
known locations. The greatest distance determines the error (dc in
Figure 4) in estimating the unknown locations from SB-LSH hashes.
Moreover, the error increases dramatically and proportionally to
larger actual distances in reality.
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Figure 5: Histogram of errors in computing distances from
SB-LSH values w.r.t. points at an actual distance of 25 km.
Figure 6: Histogram of errors in computing distances from
SB-LSH values w.r.t. points at an actual distance of 50 km.
7.2 Security Analysis
We now describe how ConSec thwarts a variety of security threats
drawn from the threat model in Section 3.2.
7.2.1 Modified Input Modalities. One attack pertains to modifying
the SB-LSH and HMAC values produced by ConSec-App with the
aim of poisoning the model to deny future legitimate accesses or
facilitate illegitimate accesses. While data is secured within transit
using TLS, as described in Section 5, this does not preclude an
adversary with the ability to alter some number of SB-LSH and
HMAC values within ConSec-App itself. Our experimental results
in Section 6.2 show that seven or more inaccurate modalities (of 26
in total) can be detected with low error (approximately TPR=0.975
and FPR=0.025), which somewhat decreases when a smaller number
of inputs are modified (TPR=0.8, FPR=0.2 for three inputs).
7.2.2 Server-side Privacy. Evidently, using raw contextual values
gives rise to privacy risks against honest-but-curious adversaries
who aim to exploit users’ behavioural data for ulterior purposes.
This extends to unauthorised disclosure if an attacker successfully
exfiltrates data from the server and releases it publicly after ex-
ploiting some vulnerability. We reduce the impact of these cases as
ConSec models and authenticates users’ behaviour directly from
keyed HMAC and SB-LSH values rather than raw, unprotected
values. In Section 6, we also show experimentally that significant
errors are involved when attempting to infer unknown locations
from known SB-LSH values.
7.2.3 Network Attacks. Another threat to contextual authentica-
tion systems is where a network adversary re-sends previously
observed messages containing the feature vectors (whether protec-
ted or not) to the server, with the aim of poisoning the behavioural
model and influencing the authentication algorithm. This attack
is protected through the use of a secure channel (TLS) between
the application and authentication server with replay protection.
Moreover, the contextual data vector includes a timestamp to ensure
its recentness against replay attacks.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented ConSec—a privacy-enhancing, context-
aware authentication system that utilises locality-sensitive hashing
for masking plain sensor measurements from a user device. ConSec
learns, models and authenticates users’ behaviour directly from
protected values in an outsourced fashion without disclosing raw
measurements to an honest-but-curious authentication server. We
began with a detailed review of existing contextual authentication
schemes and methods for preserving the privacy of sensitive in-
put modalities for continuous authentication generally. We then
showed how ConSec supports learning from both numerical and
categorical data in a flexible manner using the SB-LSH algorithm by
Ji et al. [15] and keyed HMACs, without incurring the complexities
of existing privacy-enhancing approaches, such as homomorphic
encryption and multi-party computation. After describing the data
types and authentication algorithms used by ConSec, experimental
results were presented using data collected from 35 users in the
field. This was followed by analyses showing its its robustness to
modified input modalities and the errors involved in attempting to
infer unknown locations from known values.
In future work, we aim to evaluate ConSec in a long-term usab-
ility study to determine users’ attitudes towards using the system
and, in particular, concretely measuring its handling of gradual
behavioural shifts in users’ behavioural patterns. We also aim to
explore the scheme’s robustness tomimicry attacks in which a phys-
ical attacker possesses the device and attempts to reconstruct the
victim’s behaviour, such as visiting their home or place of work.
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